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ORDER 
APR 151991 
* onan 
CteTk. •" ..* Court 
Utah Court of AppeaJs 
Case No. 900541-CA 
This matter is before the court upon appellant's motion to 
preclude appellee from oral argument filed March 11, 1991. 
Appellant's motion is filed pursuant to R. 26, Utah R. App. P., 
based upon appellee's failure to file a brief "within the 
applicable time period." 
The court having considered the motion, and no response 
having been filed in opposition thereto, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
that appellant's motion is granted; appellee is hereby precluded 
from oral argument in this matter. 
Dated this /f^dav of April, 1991. 
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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court under Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2A-3 (2)(j) (Supp. 1990). The Supreme Court had original 
appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3)(j) (Supp. 
1990), but has assigned the case for disposition in the Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (4) (Supp. 1990). 
ISSUE 
Whether the lower court abused its discretion by approving a 
stipulation to which Plaintiff did not agree and which does not 
include essential terms which Plaintiff required as a condition to 
the stipulation even though no record or transcript exists 
regarding the hearing in which the parties presented the 
stipulation to the Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On Thursday, April 5, 1990, at 2:30 p.m., Plaintiff Juanita 
Duncan ("Duncan"), Defendant Jamis M. Johnson ("Johnson"), and 
Defendant Kent Davis ("Davis") appeared at a settlement conference 
before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock of the Fourth Judicial 
District Court of Wasatch County, Utah. At the settlement 
conference, the parties and their counsel, after lengthy 
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discussion, agreed to certain monetary terms on which their dispute 
could be settled. As an additional essential term of the 
agreement, Duncan's counsel demanded that the settlement include a 
provision by which Davis would confess to a judgment for fraud in 
the event of a default under the agreement or his filing of a 
petition in bankruptcy. The parties did not resolve the issue in 
open court, but agreed that Duncan's counsel and Davis' counsel 
would correspond with each other to prepare language acceptable to 
Duncan. Duncan's counsel stressed that the settlement would be 
contingent on inclusion of acceptable language regarding bankruptcy 
and that such language would be an essential term of the 
settlement. It was also agreed that Duncan's counsel would submit 
a Stipulation and Order for Davis' counsel to review which would 
become the final Order in the case. These facts are more 
particularly set forth in the Affidavit of Robert Kariya filed in 
support of Duncan's Objection to the Order Dismissing Claims. A 
copy of the Affidavit has been attached and is incorporated herein 
as Exhibit "A." 
Following the Settlement Conference, Duncan's counsel mailed 
a proposed Stipulation and Order to Larry Steele ("Steele"), 
counsel for Defendant Davis. The proposed Order included in 
paragraph 3 a confession of a "judgment for actual fraud in the 
event that [Davis] defaults under the terms of this Stipulation." 
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A copy of this proposed Stipulation and Order Dismissing Claims is 
attached hereto and incorporated as Exhibit "B." On April 10, 
1990, Steele submitted to Duncan's counsel a proposed revision to 
the Order which would not require Davis to confess fraud, but which 
would require Duncan to prove fraud in the event of a default. 
Duncan's counsel objected to the revision and refused to approve 
the Order as to form or otherwise. Because the parties could not 
come to an agreement, both parties submitted their proposed Orders 
to the court. 
On May 4, 1990, notwithstanding the absence of the approval of 
Duncan or her counsel, the court entered the Order Dismissing 
Claims prepared by Steele, which conformed to Steele's proposed 
revisions, which Duncan's counsel had rejected. A copy of the 
Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "C." The Order was not based 
on any written stipulation, and is not supported by a court record 
of any oral stipulation. The same day, the court also made a 
Minute Entry inviting the parties to raise any objections they may 
have to the Order within 15 days, with instructions that if no such 
objections were raised, the Order would become final. A copy of 
the Minute Entry is attached hereto as Exhibit "D." 
On May 18, 1990, Duncan filed an Objection to Proposed Order 
on the ground that the Order did not properly reflect the 
settlement agreement of the parties. Duncan was unable to obtain 
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a transcript of the Settlement Conference to support her Objection 
because no such transcript existed due to a malfunction of the tape 
recorder used to record the proceedings. (See Statement Regarding 
Transcript of Proceedings, attached hereto as Exhibit "E")• Duncan 
subsequently filed a Motion to Set Aside the Judgment, to which 
Davis, through his counsel, responded. In a Ruling dated July 26, 
1990, Judge Bullock overruled Duncan's Objection to the Order 
Dismissing Claims and denied the Motion to Set Aside the Order 
without making any specific findings of fact. A copy of the Ruling 
is attached hereto as Exhibit "F." It is from this Ruling that 
Duncan appeals to this Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Duncan's objection to the trial court's Order is two-fold. 
First, the trial court violated Rule 4-504 (8) of the Code of 
Judicial Administration which requires all orders based on 
stipulations to be supported by a written stipulation signed by the 
parties or their attorneys or an oral stipulation made in open 
court. Second, Because the parties never reached agreement on 
essential terms of the settlement agreement—namely, acceptable 
language concerning Davis' confession of a judgment for fraud in 
the event of his default or petition in bankruptcy—the parties 
never reached a binding settlement agreement. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT'S ORDER DID NOT COMPLY WITH RULE 4-504 OF THE 
CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. 
Rule 4-504 (8) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
states as follows: 
No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation shall 
be signed or entered unless the stipulation is in writing, 
signed by the attorneys of record for the respective parties 
and filed with the clerk or the stipulation was made on the 
record. 
In considering a rule of procedure almost identical to the above-
quoted Rule, the Texas Supreme Court reasoned that this requirement 
was intended to avoid the inherent uncertainty of verbal 
agreements. Kennedy v. Hyde, 682 S.W.2d 525, 526-27 (Tex. 1984). 
Under this rule, the court concluded that an oral settlement 
agreement not in writing or on the record "was disputed and 
unenforceable at the moment its existence was denied in the 
pleadings." Id. at 530. 
In the case at bar, the trial court failed to comply with Rule 
4-504 (8). No written stipulation was ever signed by the parties 
or entered by the judge. Moreover, because the trial court's tape 
recorder malfunctioned, there is no record of a stipulation in open 
court to support the Order. By entering an Order unsupported by 
either a written stipulation or a court record, the trial court 
promoted exactly that which the Rule was designed to prevent: 
enforcement of an agreement which no reliable evidence indicated 
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was the intent of the parties. For this reason, the Order 
Dismissing Claims should be set aside. 
II. THE COURT'S ORDER IMPOSED A CONTRACT ON THE PARTIES WHERE 
NONE EXISTED. 
While the law favors settlement as a form of dispute 
resolution, settlement agreements are contracts and are bound by 
basic principles of contract law. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 
942 (Utah 1987); 15A Am. Jur. 2d, Compromise and Settlement, § 7 
(1976). Duncan contends that sound principles of contract law 
compel the conclusion that the parties failed to enter a binding 
agreement. 
Under basic contract law, no binding settlement agreement 
exists unless the parties reach a meeting of the minds. Cross v. 
District Court, 643 P.2d 39, 41 (Colo. 1982) (holding that "[i]n 
order for a settlement to be binding and enforceable, there must be 
a Nmeeting of the minds' as to the terms and conditions of the 
compromise and settlement") (quoting H.W. Houston Construction 
Company v. District Court, 632 P.2d 563, 565 (Colo. 1981)); 15A Am. 
Jur. 2d, Compromise and Settlement, § 7 (stating that "a valid 
compromise requires the mutual assent of the parties, and the 
meeting of their minds on all the essential terms of the 
agreement"). When an acceptance is given on terms substantially 
different than those of the offer, it constitutes a counteroffer, 
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and does not create a contract. Fratello v. Socorro Electric 
Cooperative, Inc. , 107 N.M. 378, 758 P. 2d 792, 795 (1988) (refusing 
to find a valid settlement agreement where the offeree's acceptance 
was not unconditional, and stating that "[i]n order to constitute 
a binding settlement contract, there must be an unconditional 
acceptance of the offer made") (quoting Silva v. Noble, 85 N.M. 
677, 678, 515 P.2d 1281, 1282 (1973)). 
Throughout this litigation and particularly in the settlement 
negotiations at and prior to the Settlement Conference, Duncan has 
demanded that any settlement include a provision by which Davis, at 
such time as he should default under the settlement agreement, 
would confess to a judgment of fraud against him which could not be 
discharged in bankruptcy. Davis now contends that he has never 
agreed to this "essential term," and argues instead that the 
opposite meaning, as expressed in his proposed Order Dismissing 
Claims, was in fact the understanding of the parties. Davis 
offers, however, no evidence that Duncan or her counsel have agreed 
to this term, and Duncan maintains that from the outset she has 
refused to agree to any settlement which does not include a 
confession of fraud. Therefore, the parties have not reached a 
meeting of the minds on the essential element concerning Davis' 
potential bankruptcy, and the Order is thus based on an invalid 
settlement agreement. 
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Under contract law, it is also clear that no settlement 
agreement exists if there remains a fundamental disagreement on a 
substantial term. Fratello v. Socorro Electric Cooperative, Inc., 
107 N.M. 378, 758 P.2d 792, 795 (1988). The court in Gaines v. 
Nortrust Realty Management, Inc., 422 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. App. 1982), 
set down the minimum requirements for a binding settlement: 
a fundamental principle of the law of contracts is that 
there must be mutuality of agreement, and there can be no 
such mutuality when there is no common intention. . . . 
Thus, "[t]o be judicially enforceable . . . a settlement 
agreement . . . must be sufficiently specific as to be 
capable of implementation. . . .[C]ourts will not 
attempt to enforce a settlement agreement that is too 
vague or ambiguous in its meaning or effect." United 
Mine Workers v. Consolidation Coal Co., 666 F.2d 806, 
809-10 (3d Cir. 1981). Parties to a settlement agreement 
must reach mutual agreement on every essential element of 
the proposed settlement. "For [a settlement] to be 
binding on the parties it should be clear that it is full 
and complete, covers all issues, and is understood by all 
litigants concerned." Cross v. Cook, 14 7 Ga. App. 695, 
250 S.E.2d 28, 29 (1978). 
422 So. 2d at 1039-40 (citations omitted). 
In the case before this Court, no binding oral settlement 
agreement was reached because at the time of the Settlement 
Conference, the parties had not yet resolved whether Davis would 
confess a judgment of fraud in the event of default or bankruptcy. 
In fact, from Duncan's perspective, the entire settlement agreement 
was expressly conditioned on a satisfactory provision requiring 
such a confession of fraud. Therefore, because this substantial 
term remains unresolved, no binding settlement contract exists. 
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Duncan further contends that the trial court was without 
authority to impose the settlement agreement on the parties by 
Order. It is a well-settled proposition in Utah that a court 
having before it a matter may summarily enforce a settlement 
agreement between the parties, but that power does not allow the 
court to create an agreement where none exists. Tracy-Collins Bank 
and Trust Company v. Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605, 609 (Utah 1979) 
(holding that summary enforcement of settlement agreements is ill 
suited to "situations presenting complex factual issues related 
either to the formation or the consummation of the contract"). In 
Zions First National Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 781 
P.2d 478 (Utah App. 1989), the court held that a motion to compel 
settlement may be granted only "if the record establishes a binding 
agreement and vthe excuse for non-performance is comparatively 
unsubstantial.'" (quoting, Tracy-Collins Bank and Trust Company v. 
Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605, 609 (Utah 1979)). 
The case at bar includes a complex array of claims for 
fraudulent misrepresentation against two separate defendants. 
Moreover, the prospect of Davis filing bankruptcy, which has been 
a key element of all settlement discussions throughout this case, 
complicates the issues even further. Although the trial court had 
authority to hear the case and enter judgment thereon, it did not 
have the authority to impose a contract on the parties absent 
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mutual assent. Therefore, Duncan contends that the court's entry 
of the Order, in the complete absent of any evidence of an 
agreement to which Duncan had assented, is tantamount to entry of 
a judgment without a hearing and a clear abuse of discretion• 
Finally, Duncan notes that a settlement contract necessarily 
includes terms expressly required by the parties. Moreover, when 
a party breaches a settlement agreement, the other party has an 
option to rescind and proceed on the underlying claim. Butcher v. 
Gilrov, 744 P.2d 311, 312 n. 2 (Utah App. 1987). 
In this case, any oral settlement agreement must necessarily 
have contained a provision, as Duncan expressly demanded, requiring 
Davis' confession of a fraud judgment in the event of default or 
bankruptcy. By submitting to the court a proposed Order with 
language contrary to those terms, Davis has breached any oral 
agreement that may have existed, and thus destroyed its binding 
effect. 
CONCLUSION 
While Duncan concedes that settlement of claims is favorable 
method of dispute resolution, she contends that allowing the trial 
court's Order to stand would be an affront to normal settlement 
processes and could actually deter settlement in the future. 
First, the Order ignores Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
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Administration which requires orders based on stipulations to be 
supported by a writing or a statement on the record. If an order 
can be based upon an unrecorded oral stipulation as Davis alleges, 
parties may be hesitant to discuss claims orally for fear that 
their statements may be incorporated in a final order without their 
consent. Rule 4-504, when applied properly, removes this danger 
from settlement negotiations. Duncan thus urges this Court to 
apply the Rule strictly to the facts of this case and set aside the 
trial court's Order. Second, the trial court's Order removes the 
element of mutual intent from the requirements for a valid 
settlement agreement. Because no transcript of the Settlement 
Conference is available, and the trial court in its denial of 
Duncan's Objection to the Order did not make any findings of fact, 
there is no evidence before this Court concerning the formation of 
a settlement contract other than that set forth in memoranda, 
affidavits, and other retrospective evidence. In this light, where 
no hard evidence indicates mutual intent to contract, it is clearly 
beyond the trial court's power to impose a contract on the parties 
based on its recollection of the parties' interactions. Duncan 
contends that the above arguments compel the conclusion that entry 
of the Order was an abuse of discretion and that the trial court's 
denial of Duncan's Motion to Set Aside the Judgment was error. 
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DATED this £B day of January, 1991. 
WOODBURY, JENSEN, KESLER 
& SWINTON, P.C. 
flittnrnry-i for Appalla 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned, Robert Kariya, of the law firm of Woodbury, 
Jensen, Kesler & Swinton, P.C., counsel for the 
Plaintiff/Appellant, hereby certifies that he caused four (4) true 
and correct copies of the Brief of Appellant to be sent, U.S. First 
Class Mail, postage pre-paid, to each of the following on the 29th 
day of January, 1991: 
Larry A. Steele, Esq. 
319 West 100 South, Suite A 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
A. Paul Schwenke, Esq. 
P. 0. Box 7853 
Murray, Utah 84107 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
Russell S. Walker - #3363 
Robert Kariya - #4858 
Olga A. Bruno - #5259 
WOODBURY, JENSEN, KESLER & SWINTON 
265 East 100 South, Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-1100 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
JUANITA DUNCAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMIS M. JOHNSON, 
KENT DAVIS, 
Defendants. 
and ] 
i AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT KARIYA 
i Civil No. 6478 
i Judge George E. Ballif 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Robert Kariya, being first duly sworn, hereby depose and 
state that: 
1. I am a member of the Utah State Bar. 
2. I am employed by Woodbury, Jensen, Kesler & Swinton, 
P.C., Attorneys at Law, the law firm which represents Plaintiff in 
this matter, 
3. On Thursday, April 5, 1990, at 2:30 p.m., I represented 
the Plaintiff in a settlement conference held in this matter before 
the Honorable J. Robert Bullock. 
h
 if 
4. At the Settlement Conference, the parties agreed on terms 
regarding the payment by Defendant Davis to Plaintiff of certain 
sums of money for settlement of this case. However, Davis' 
counsel, Mr. Larry Steele, and I were to correspond with each other 
and prepare suitable language for a stipulation regarding the 
effect of a possible bankruptcy petition by Davis. I stressed at 
the Settlement Conference to all parties that settlement would be 
contingent upon the parties arriving at agreeable language in the 
stipulation regarding the possible bankruptcy. 
5. On April 10, 1990, Mr. Steele submitted to me a proposed 
revision to paragraph three of the stipulation I had prepared, 
which would materially change the context of the stipulation and 
settlement of this case, by requiring Plaintiff to prove fraud in 
the event of Davis files or reopens a bankruptcy case. It was my 
understanding, and Plaintiff's requirement that Davis was to 
confess to a judgment for fraud, pursuant to the Settlement 
Conference, if he defaulted under the terms of the agreement. 
6. The Order Dismissing Claims, which was apparently 
entered by the Court, does not reflect the terras of the settlement 
which Plaintiff intended or accepted at the Settlement Conference. 
7. On April 17, 1990 I contacted Diane Burgener, Deputy 
Clerk of the Wasatch Clerk's office, and was told by Ms. Burgener 
that a transcript of the settlement conference could not be made 
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because the electronic tape recorder which was used during the 
conference had malfunctioned, and since no court reporter attended 
the conference, no record of the settlement conference was made. 
I confirmed this information with Ms. Burgener on May 15, 1990. 
FURTHER Affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this (Oftf day of May, 1990. 
Robert Kariya ^^ ^ v 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this 
My Commission Expires: cJfajJj/Mrt-
NOTARY PUBLIC 
VACA C, fWP- Residing at: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Objection to Order Dismissing Claims were served, via first class 
U.S. mail, postage prepaid, this /P^" day of May, 1990, to the 
following: 
Larry A. Steele 
Attorney for Davis 
319 West 100 South, Suite A 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Paul Schwenke 
Attorney for Johnson 
P.O. Box 57853 
Murray, Utah 84107 
rk.aff 
W.<£^ 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
Glen W. Roberts - #4172 
Robert Kariya - #4858 
Olga A. Bruno - #5259 
WOODBURY, JENSEN, KESLER & SWINTON 
265 East 100 South, Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-1100 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
JUANITA DUNCAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMIS M. JOHNSON, 
KENT DAVIS, 
Defendants. 
and 1 
) STIPULATION FOR SETTLEMENT 
) AND ORDER DISMISSING CLAIMS 
i Civil No. 6478 
i Judge J. Robert Bullock 
STIPULATION 
Plaintiff Juanita Duncan, Defendant Kent Davis ("Davis"), and 
Defendant Jamis M. Johnson ("Johnson"), in consideration of the 
mutual covenants and conditions herein contained and for Ten 
Dollars ($10-00) and other good and valuable consideration, the 
receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, hereby 
set forth their Stipulation for Settlement ("Stipulationn) of the 
above-described matter as follows: 
1. Dismissal, Plaintiff shall dismiss with prejudice any 
and all of her claims against Davis and Johnson; Defendant Johnson 
shall dismiss with prejudice any and all of his claims against 
Plaintiff and Davis; and Davis shall dismiss with prejudice any and 
all of his claims against Plaintiff and Johnson in this matter, 
upon execution of this Stipulation and the transfer to Plaintiff 
by Davis of the consideration described in paragraph 1 (a) of this 
Stipulation, subject to this case being reopened for entry of 
judgment in favor of Plaintiff against Davis in the event that 
Davis does not make timely and accurate payment of $30,000, plus 
interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum payable as follows: 
a. Upon execution of this Stipulation, $2,000 in 
certified funds; plus $4,500 which shall consist of 
Warranty Deeds ("Deeds") conveying good and 
marketable title to those certain real properties 
located in Wasatch County, state of Utah more 
particularly described in Exhibit "A" attached 
hereto and by this reference incorporated herein; 
and 
b. The sum of $200 beginning May 1, 1990, and 
continuing on the first day of each and every month 
thereafter until April 1, 19 94; and 
c. The sum of $1,000 on April 30, 1991, April 30, 1992, 
and April 30, 1993; and 
d- On or before May 1, 1994, the total unpaid balance 
of the $30,000, which should total approximately 
$23,500 on May 1, 1994 if all payments hereunder are 
made in a timely and accurate manner. 
2. Default. In the event of the failure of Davis to fulfill 
his obligations and make timely payments under this Stipulation, 
Plaintiff shall have the right, upon filing an affidavit of such 
default after a period of twenty (20) days after the due date of 
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any payment required hereunder, without prior written notice to 
Davis of her intention to obtain judgment against Davis, to reopen 
this case and obtain an entry of judgment against Davis in the 
amount of $30,000, plus interest thereon at the rate of 10% per 
annum, plus reasonable attorney's fees incurred herein, less any 
payments received by Plaintiff under the terms of this Stipulation. 
3. Judgment. Davis hereby confesses judgment for actual 
fraud, in favor of Plaintiff in the event he defaults under the 
terms of this Stipulation, in the amount of $30,000, plus interest 
thereon at the rate of 10% per annum, plus reasonable attorney's 
fees incurred herein, less any payments received by Plaintiff under 
the terms of this Stipulation, The judgment shall bear interest 
at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum until satisfied. 
4. Amendment. Any amendment, modification, termination, or 
rescission affecting this Stipulation shall be made in writing and 
signed by the parties. 
5. Effective Date. This Stipulation shall become effective 
upon execution by the parties to this Stipulation, on the date so 
executed. 
6. Successors. This Stipulation shall be binding upon, and 
inure to the benefit of, the legal representatives, successors and 
assigns of the parties hereto. 
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7. Attorneys Fees. Each party herein shall bear its own 
fees and costs, including attorneys fees, incurred to date in 
regard to this action, except as otherwise set forth herein. 
8. Notices. Any notice required or desired to given 
hereunder shall be deemed sufficient if sent by First Class UfS. 
Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the respective parties as 
follows: 
JUANITA DUNCAN 
C/0 WOODBURY, JENSEN, 
KESLER & SWINTON, P.C. 
265 EAST 100 SOUTH SUITE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
KENT DAVIS 
4543 HILLSIDE 
VERNAL UT 84078 
JAMIS M. JOHNSON 
165 SOUTH WEST TEMPLE #300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
DATED this day of April, 1990. 
JUANITA DUNCAN 
KENT DAVIS 
JAMIS M. JOHNSON 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
WOODBURY, JENSEN, 
KESLER & SWINTON, P.C. 
By Robert Karj 
Attorneys for Juanita Duncan 
Larry A- Steele 
Attorney for Kent Davis 
A. Paul Schwenke 
Attorney for Jamis M. Johnson 
ORDER 
Based upon the Stipulation for Settlement set forth above and 
good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the claims of 
Plaintiff Juanita Duncan against Jamis M. Johnson and Kent Davis; 
and Jamis M. Johnson against Juanita Duncan in this case are hereby 
dismissed with prejudice, subject to the case being reopened for 
entry of judgment in favor of Plaintiff against Kent Davis in 
accordance with the terms of the Stipulation for Settlement. 
ENTERED this day of , 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable J. Robert Bullock 
District Court Judge 
5 
EXHIBIT MA" 
That certain real property situated in Wasatch County, State 
of Utah and more particularly described as follows: 
Lot 1 
Lot 10, Block A, Soldier Summit Survey 
Lot 2 
Lot 15, Block 6, Soldier Summit Survey 
E X H I B I T WCM 
LARRY A. STEELE, #3090 
Attorney for Defendant Kent Davis 
319 West 100 Southf Suite A 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone (801) 789-1301 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASATCH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JUANITA DUNCAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMIS M. JOHNSON and 
KENT DAVIS, 
Defendants• 
Plaintiff Juanita Duncan with her attorney Bob Kariya, 
Defendant Kent Davis ("Davis") with Larry A. Steele an attorney 
making a special appearance, and Defendant Jamis M# Johnson 
("Johnson") with his attorney, all appearing before the Court and 
discussing the issues and in consideration of the mutual covenants 
and conditions herein contained, the parties set forth their 
Stipulation for Settlement ("Stipulation") on the record at a 
hearing held before this Court on April 5, 1990, of the above-
described matters and which Stipulation entered was as follows: 
!• Dismissal. Plaintiff shall dismiss with prejudice any and 
all of her claims against Davis and Johnson; Defendant Johnson 
1 
ORDER DISMISSING CLAIMS 
Civil No. 6478 
Judge J. Robert Bullock 
shall dismiss with prejudice any and all of his claims against 
Plaintiff and Davis; and Davis shall dismiss with prejudice any and 
all of his claims against Plaintiff and Johnson in this matter, 
upon execution of this Stipulation and the transfer to Plaintiff by 
Davis of the consideration described in paragraph 1 (a) of this 
Stipulation, subject to this case being reopened for entry of 
judgment in favor of Plaintiff against Davis in the event that 
Davis does not make timely and accurate payment of $30,000.00, plus 
interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum payable as follows: 
a. Upon execution of this Stipulation, 
$2,000.00 in certified funds; plus $4,500.00 
which shall consist of Warranty Deeds 
("Deeds") conveying good and marketable title 
to those certain real properties located in 
Wasatch County, State of Utah, more 
particularly described in Exhibit "AM attached 
hereto and by this reference incorporated 
herein; and 
b* The sum of $200.00 beginning May 1, 1990, 
and continuing on the first day of each and 
every month thereafter until April 1, 1994; 
and 
c- The sum of $1,000.00 on April 30, 1991, 
April 30, 1992, and April 30, 1993; and 
d. On or before May 1, 1994, the total unpaid 
balance of the $30,000.00, which should total 
approximately $23,500.00 on May 1, 1994, if 
all payments hereunder are made in a timely 
and accurate manner-
2. Default • In the event of the failure of Davis to fulfill 
his obligations and make timely payments under this Stipulation, 
2 
Plaintiff shall have tl right, upon filing an a( idav)t of such 
default after a period of twenty (20) days after the due da~te of 
any payment required hereunder, without prior written notice to 
Davis of her intention to obtain judgment against Davis, to reopen 
this case and obtain an entry of judgment against Davis in the 
amount of $30,000.00, plus interest thereon at the rate of 10% per 
annum, plus reasonable attorney's fees incurred herein, less any 
payments received by Plaintiff under the terms of this Stipulation* 
3. Judgment. In the event Davis defaults under the terms of 
this Stipulation, Davis hereby confesses judgment in the amount of 
$30,000,00, plus interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum, 
plus reasonable attorney's fees incurred herein, less any payments 
received by Plaintiff under the terms of this Stipulation. The 
judgment shall bear interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per 
annum until satisfied- In the event Davis defaults in the 
performance of this Stipulation and files or reopens a bankruptcy 
case, Davis agrees and stipulates that any automatic stay imposed 
by the Bankruptcy Court will not prevent Plaintiff from entering a 
judgment under the terms of this paragraph and this Stipulation. 
By this Stipulation, Plaintiff does not waive any of her rights to 
present evidence of fraud in defense of any action by Davis to 
discharge Plaintiff's claim in bankruptcy. 
4. Amendment. Any amendment, modification, termination, or 
3 
rescission affecting this Stipulation shall be made in writing and 
signed by the parties. 
5. Effective Date. This Stipulation shall become effective 
upon execution by the parties to this Stipulation, on the date so 
executed* 
6* Successors. This Stipulation shall be binding upon, and 
inure to the benefit of, the legal representatives, successors and 
assigns of the parties hereto. 
7. Attorney's Fees. Each party herein shall bear its own 
fees and costs, including attorney's fees, incurred to date in 
regard to this action. 
8. Notices. Any notice required or desired to be given 
hereunder shall be deemed sufficient if sent by First Class U« S. 
Hail, postage prepaid, addressed to the respective parties as 
follows: 
Juanita Duncan 
c/o WOODBURY, JENSEN, KESLER 
& SWINTON, P.C. 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Kent Davis 
966 North 2100 West 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Jamis M. Johnson 
165 South West Temple, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Based upon the Stipulation for Settlement set forth above and 
4 
good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the claims of 
Plaintiff Juanita Duncan against Jamis M. Johnson and Kent Davis; 
and Jamis M, Johnson against Juanita Duncan in this case are hereby 
dismissed with prejudicef subject to the case being reopened for 
entry of judgment in favor of Plaintiff against Kent Davis in 
accordance with the terms of this Stipulation for Settlement. 
ENTERED this day of , 1990-
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
WOODBURY, JENSEN, KESLER 
& SWINTON, P.C. 
Honorable J. Robert Bullock 
District Court Judge 
By: Robert Kariya 
Attorneys for Juanita Duncan 
A. Paul "S^tfwenke 
Attorney for Jamis M, Johnson thurs 
5 
Lot 1 
Lot 10f Block A, Soldier Summit Survey 
Lot 2 
Lot 15, Block 6, Soldier Summit Su 
rvey 
lurs 
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EXHIBIT "D" 
HJMAY 7 v^u J 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COORT" 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
********** 
JUANITA DUNCAN 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMIS M. JOHNSON and 
KENT DAVIS, 
Case Number: 6478 
MAY 4, 1990 
J. ROBERT BULLOCK, JUDGE 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Defendant. 
********** 
It is the Court's recollection that a stipulation of the 
parties was arrived at on the record on April 5, 1990, 
substantially as set forth in the proposed Order Dismissing Claims 
prepared by counsel for Kent Davis, and mailed to the Court under 
date of April 16, 1990. 
As of this date the court has signed the propsoed order 
and the Court Clerk in Utah County will forward said Order to the 
Court Clerk in Wasatch County for filing. 
Within 15 days from this date any party who contends that 
the original Order does not reflect the stipulation, substantially 
in substance and effect may file a written motion to set aside the 
Order, accompanied by a transcript of the proceedings. If any 
such motion and transcript are filed within said 15 day period, 
the Court will fix a time for oral argument thereon, otherwise the 
Order shall become final, and the parties will forthwith comply 
with the terms thereof. 
EXHIBIT n"M 
Jeffrey K. Woodbury - #4172 
Robert Kariya - #4858 
Olga A. Bruno - #5259 
WOODBURY, JENSEN, KESLER & SWINTON 
265 East 100 South, Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-1100 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AN! i I'OK WASATCH COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
JUANITA DUNCAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
JAMIS M. JOHNSON and 
KENT DAVIS, 
Defendants.. 
) STATEMENT REGARDING TRANSCRIPT 
) OF PROCEEDINGS 
) • i " I,1 
) Jucige J . Robert bullock 
Comes now the appellant, Juanita Duncan, by and through 
com ise.,1 of : ecoi d . Robert Ka r i ya , of., the law firm of "woodbury, 
Jensen, Kesier c* Swinton , P.C. and pursuant to Rule i i
 v t, , i ""he 
Utah Rules cr the Appellant Procedure, hereby states tnat Appellant 
canno i i . . ^  u__ ~nrr settlement 
conference ne„c Apr: • , - • * ; . . because er ;^ rd 
recording of the proceedings was defective en: :.c f tner transcript 
exists .' 
Appellant war directed b* Jucg^ J Robert Bulloch to ii.ie a 
copy oi 11 Ie zx" ar - ttiemert conference oroceedincs 
along with Aooellan; r^LJL; - s^^ r.s_ce Aooeiiee'b o: ;::;>...?sec 
Order discussing claims, pursuant to the Kinute Entry, dated May 4, 
1990. However, when Appellant requested a copy of the transcript 
from the court clerk, she discovered none existed- Consequently, 
Appellant is unable to request that a transcript of the April 5, 
1990 proceedings be filed at this time. 
DATED this 5th day of September, 1990. 
WOODBURY, JENSEN, KESLER 
& SWINTON, P.C. 
^A/za/1/^^ 
Robert Iuiriyg 
Attorney for Appe ilaCT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid by U.S. 
mail, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Statement of Issues 
on Appeal on this ./g^L. day of September, 19 9 0 to the 
following: 
Larry A. Steele 
Attorney for Kent Davis 
319 west 100 South, Suite A 
Vernal, Utah 84 07 8 
Paul Schwenke 
Attorney for Jamis Johnson 
P.O. Box 57853 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court 
332 State Capital Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Fourth District Court Clerk 
Wasatch County 
25 N. Main 
Heber City, Utah 84032 
F:\r.isc\Ouncin.s:a 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
********** 
JUANITA DUNCAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMIS JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
Case Number: 
RULING 
Civil Number 6478 
********** 
Counsel having requested that Plaintiffs Motion to Set 
Aside Order Dismissing claims be submitted to the Court for 
decision, and the Court having reviewed the file, including all 
affidavits and memoranda pertaining thereto filed herein, and 
having fully considered the legal positions of counsel, now rules, 
holds and decides as follows: 
1. All objections to the Court's Order Dismissing Claims 
dated May 4, 1990, are overrruled. 
2. Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside said Order dated May 
31, 1990, is hereby denied. / 
Dated at Provo, Utah, this day of July, 1990. 
BY THE COURT 
ROBERT BULLOCK, JUDGE 
